THE MISSING INSTITUTION IN EUROPEAN RAIL FREIGHT CORRIDOR GOVERNANCE: LESSONS FROM AVIATION AND ELECTRICITY

Abstract

Recent research has shown that the application of cooperative game theory in European rail freight corridor governance, as a tool for enhancing cooperation among governments and infrastructure managers, can improve corridor performance and revenue generation through cooperative game solution concepts. However, the practical application of such a model depends on a critical institutional assumption: the existence of a governance body able to centrally collect track access charges or, at minimum, organize financial transfers between corridor participants. This paper addresses this institutional void. It examines the current governance structure of Rail Freight Corridors under Regulation (EU) No 913/2010 and argues that existing corridor bodies function primarily as coordination platforms rather than entities with fiscal authority. To identify a feasible path forward, the paper compares rail with electricity and aviation sectors, where these issues are already addressed. On this basis, it proposes a practical corridor-level institutional model capable of operationalizing cooperative revenue allocation, improving corridor performance, and strengthening the competitiveness of rail freight in the European transport market.